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Abstract
In this paper, we want to argue for a frame-based analysis of action-related con-
cepts as a means for understanding the thesis of grounded cognition, i. e. the thesis
that concepts are grounded in sensorimotor processes. We will give an overview
of frame analysis and specify frames for action-related concepts. We will then
argue for the employment of the frame-based analysis-method and show why this
method of analysis has clear advantages over other methods of analysis. The ad-
vantages of frames especially become apparent in the capability to specify sensori-
motor parts of a concept, as well as in highlighting abstraction mechanisms within
concepts. The representation of modal attributes without introducing modal oper-
ators is another speciVc advantage of frames over other formats of representation.
1 Introduction
The research concerning the problem of grounding language in action so far is
mostly empirical. The Veld is dominated by cognitive psychology and neuro-
science, where behavioral and neurological measures are used to relate the pos-
session and processing of conceptual knowledge to sensorimotor processes. The
work of Pulvermüller (2005) or Glenberg & Kaschak (2002), just to name two,
clearly showed that there is a connection between concept processing and motor-
processes. However, the theoretical framework of grounded cognition is not yet
spelled out in detail, so it remains still an open question of what it exactly means
for concepts to be grounded in action.
In this paper we will present and discuss a tool for adequately analyzing con-
cepts. This special kind of concept analysis will then provide a better understand-
ing of what it means for a concept to be grounded in sensorimotor processes. The
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idea is, in short, to analyze action-related concepts within frames. The frame the-
ory in question was originally developed by Barsalou (1992) as a theory of a gen-
eral format of concept representation; the frame theory underlying this paper is a
speciVed and reVned modiVcation of Barsalou’s proposal. According to this mod-
iVcation, frames are understood as recursive attribute-value structures. Frames
have a lot of advantages over other forms of representing concepts, but due to
brevity, we will focus on one special feature of frames concerning action-related
concepts: The decomposition of action-related concepts via frame-analysis is able
to specify motor-values within these concepts. If motor-values can be analyzed as
very basic values in the frame of a certain concept, the conclusion clearly is that
this concept is grounded in motor processes. Concepts that do not have motor
values as very basic values can hardly be grounded in the relevant sense.
In the following, we will give examples of frames and the idea of special motor
values, and we will then show why frames have clear advantages over other
formats of representation e. g. Vrst-order predicate logics. First of all, however,
we will introduce the strategy of frame analysis.
2 Concepts and frames
Barsalou (1992) proposes that the content of concepts (understood as mental enti-
ties as opposed to linguistic entities) can be naturally accounted for in terms of
frames. Frames as recursive attribute-value structures have been widely used as a
general format for knowledge representation, e. g. for capturing linguistic knowl-
edge (Fillmore 1970) or situational knowledge (Minsky 1974). Minsky (1974:1)
regards a frame as a “data-structure for representing a stereotyped situation [. . . ].
Once a frame is proposed to represent a situation, a matching process tries to
assign values to each frame’s terminals, consistent with the markers [restricting
the admissible values] at each place.” Minsky’s aim is to simulate this cognitive
process in applications of artiVcial intelligence. Like Minsky, most approaches
consider a frame as a Vxed Wat set of attributes or slots the values of which get
Vlled by the situation, the linguistic context or whatsoever. By sticking to a Vxed
set of attributes, those frames essentially reduce to feature lists and categorization
to value pattern recognition (1992:23). In contrast, Barsalou (1992:21) argues in fa-
vor of frames as “dynamic relational structures whose form is Wexible and context
dependent”. He presents psychological evidence for attribute-value structures de-
294
Analyzing Concepts
rived from behavioral animal studies. These studies indicate that animals encode
stimulus information as attribute values and not as independent features. Fur-
thermore, he gives empirical evidence for the importance of conceptual relations
in human cognition. Here we will brieWy sketch our frame account which builds
on Barsalou’s Wexible cognitive approach, but provides it with a rigid formal foun-
dation.
The attributes in a concept frame are the general properties or aspects by which
the respective concept is described (e. g. SHAPE, LOCATION).1 Their values are
concrete or underspeciVed speciVcations (e. g., [SHAPE: round], [LOCATION: for-
est]). The attribute values can themselves be complex frames and thus described
by additional attributes. For example the value forest of the attribute LOCATION
can be further speciVed by attributes like SIZE or TREE SPECIES. Due to their
recursivity, frames are Wexible enough to represent information of any desired
grade of detail. We assume that attributes in frames assign unique values to ob-
jects and thus describe functional relations. Formally, frames can be represented
by connected directed graphs where the arcs correspond to attributes. As at-
tributes are functions, no node may have two equally labeled outgoing arcs. The
nodes may be labeled by types which restrict the attribute domains and ranges,
i. e. the set of objects for which an attribute is adequate and the set of values an
attribute can take. Figure 1 shows a simpliVed frame of the concept ‘round shelter
in an oak forest’.
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Figure 1: Frame of the concept ‘round shelter in an oak forest’
Figure 1 shows two additional notational devices which we use in our graph
representations of frames: First, the double border at the shelter node marks it
as the central node of the frame; it indicates that the graph represents a frame
1 Throughout this paper attributes are typeset in capitals and their values in italics.
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about shelters. Second, by using a rectangular node for the central shelter node,
we identify the whole frame as a concept or category frame which corresponds
to a 1-place predicate the argument of which is represented by the shelter node.
A round central node would indicate instead that it is a frame of a not further
speciVed category member of the category ‘round shelter in an oak forest’. As
types correspond to 1-place predicates and attributes to functions, the informa-
tion modeled in the frame can be expressed in the logical formula:
λx.shelter (x) ∧ round (SHAPE (x)) ∧ forest (LOCATION (x))
∧ oak (TREE SPECIES (LOCATION (x)))
In contrast to other frame theories, our frames are capable of representing not
only sortal concepts like ‘shelter’, which denote classical categories, but also re-
lational ones like ‘sibling’or ‘mother’ (Petersen 2007/2015); the referents of the
latter concepts are given by a relation to a possessor (‘sibling of’, ‘mother of’).
Frames of relational concepts diUer from frames of sortal concepts in that they
have an additional rectangular node for the possessor argument. Figure 2 shows
the frame for the sibling concept. It consists of three nodes, one for the sibling
itself (rectangular, double border), one for the person it is the sibling of (rectangu-
lar, single border) and one for the mother of both (round). The relation between
the two persons is constituted by the fact that they both have the same mother.2
This is modeled by the single node to which the two MOTHER-arcs point. Note
that in contrast to classical frame accounts our approach does not presuppose
that the central node of a frame, i. e. the node which determines what is denoted
by a frame, is a root node of the frame graph.3
An adequate frame theory needs means of restricting the set of admissible
frames. Therefore, frame nodes may be labeled by types. The types are ordered in
a type hierarchy which is enriched by appropriateness conditions which constrain
the domain and range of attributes. Thus the type signature tells which type of
entities can have a certain attribute and of which type the values of each attribute
are. Thus we can infer the type of a nodes from the connecting attribute, unless it
2 Note that all frames in this paper are severely simpliVed. For example, the frame in Vgure 2 models
the sibling concept as being purely determined by the mother relation, leaving aside fathers or
socially established family relations.
3 A root of a directed graph is a node from which all other nodes can be reached via paths of directed
arcs.
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Figure 2: Frame for the concept ‘sibling’
is further restricted by other constraints in a particular frame. For example, if a
type signature speciVes that the domain of the attribute MOTHER is person and
that its range is woman, then the information modeled by the frame in Vgure 2
can be expressed by
λyλx.MOTHER(x) = MOTHER(y) ∧ person (x)
∧ person (y) ∧ woman (MOTHER (x))
In contrast to Vgure 2, Vgure 1 shows an example of a frame in which the type
labels at the nodes eUectively restrict the attribute domains and ranges. For in-
stance LOCATION is a very general attribute which applies to all kind of physical
objects (not only to shelters) and which takes all kinds of locations as values (not
only forests). The formal details of our frame account can be found in Petersen
(2007/2015) and Petersen & Osswald (2014).
Although the informational content of a frame can be expressed in classical
logical formulas, it is more natural to assume that concepts are mentally stored
in terms of frames than in terms of formulas. As Barsalou (1992) points out,
there is empirical evidence for attribute-value sets and relations in cognition.
In frames, concepts remain units although they may be highly structured. This
unity is concealed in logical formulas by multiple occurring variables. Within
frame theory we are not forced to stipulate a Vxed arity for each predicate as
in predicate logic where predicates are constants. Finally, due to the non-linear
structure of frames, one is not required to stipulate an order on the arguments.
Rather, substructures can be addressed via labeled symbols instead of ordered
argument positions which is cognitively more adequate. By using oscillatory
neural networks as a biologically motivated model, Petersen & Werning (2007)
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give evidence for the cognitive adequacy of our frame model and shows how
frames might be implemented in the cortex.
3 Motor processes in frames
This framework can now be used to address the question of how the nature of
grounded concepts can be speciVed.
We will introduce some examples of concepts which explicitly involve action
and show how action-involvement as a property of a concept can be deVned in
frames. Because these concepts have a quite simple structure, they serve as an
ideal starting point. In the next step, the framework will be generalized to cover
other types of (and especially linguistically expressible) concepts.
As we have seen above, frames are characterized by recursive attribute-value
structures. Attributes are taken to assign unique values to objects. The values of
our interest here are motor-values. They are understood as explicitly representing
a movement or a set of movements within a frame. So, the values in these action
frames are really parameters that are used in movement control, and not mere
numbers or other kinds of abstract values.
Let us start with a simple example: Ants are dynamically representing the
location of their nest in terms of the angle to the sun in which the ant has to
walk and the number of steps it has to make (Gallistel 1993, Wittlinger et al.
2006). A frame for the ant’s representation of the location of the nest is shown
in Vgure 3.
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Figure 3: Frame for an ant’s representation of the location of the nest
What is crucial here is the meaning of the two values in the lower nodes.
Although the graphic shows number variables, the values in the nodes represent
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speciVc motor-parameters, in this case the angle the ant has to turn and the
number of steps it has to make.4 As ants are generally held to be unable to
count, for ants have no concept of numbers as numbers, those values are simply
movements the ant can make. Of course, the ant “knows” how many steps it takes
to return to the nest, but it does not “know” it in terms of numbers (Franks et al.
2006). One would be inclined to say that a speciVc motor-program is running
that determines how long and in which direction the ant has to travel to reach
the nest. But the ant is not just unable to count, it is also unable to represent these
movements as a property of the nest, so we would not want to speak of the ant
representing various properties of the nest, namely the heading and the distance
(Vosgerau 2007). Rather, it is a good example of a movement representation.
As our interest is in grounded concepts, we need to give an example of a
conceptual representation which implies action in the above sense. To stick with
the example, a frame thus characterized is shown in Vgure 4.
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Figure 4: Frame for a conceptual representation of the location of the nest
4 In the current paper, the dynamic changes of the motor values which occur while actual moving are
not in focus. These changes could be modeled as dynamic updates of event frames in a multi-layered
architecture as proposed by Naumann (2012).
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Here, the location of the nest is represented as a property of an object, namely
the nest. Thus, the representation can in principle be used to represent very
diUerent locations of diUerent objects. Technically, this is done by exchanging
the speciVc value of the central node to denote another object. In this sense, this
representation can be said to be conceptual: One and the same property can be
ascribed to diUerent objects (Newen & Bartels 2007), and we can clearly analyze
one part of the frame to stand for an object (the central node) and another part
to stand for a property (the rest of the frame standing for the property of being
located at this-and-that point) (Vosgerau 2008).
What we have here is a tool for describing the internal structure of concepts.
A concept is constituted by a central node to which properties are assigned by
diUerent attributes which assign values. These values, as we have shown, can be
motor-processes, in that they represent movements.
The next question obviously has to address the motor-values. What are the
constraints to represent motor processes?
Every concept can be analyzed and decomposed. This process of analysis will
at one point or another come to a basal level. Basal-level properties are reWected
in the end nodes of a concept-frame. One way of dealing with motor processes
in concepts is to deVne them as basal-level-values and to put them in the end
nodes of a frame. A concept which contains motor values as basal-level-values
can then be said to be grounded in motor abilities. However, if a concept does
not contain basal-level-values (i. e. it only contains values that can be further
analyzed) or if it contains basal-level-values that are not motoric, then it cannot be
characterized as being grounded in motor abilities. (It might still be the case that
a concept is grounded in sensory processes if its basal-level-values are sensory
values; however, this is not the focus of this paper.)
4 SigniVcance of frames over other methods of analyzing
concepts
The crucial point so far is that end-values in frames can be motor-parameters.
This means that the same values can Vgure in motor-control mechanisms. This
can be displayed most easily when motor processes are represented in frames
as well. The possibility of analyzing motor processes (and the speciVc represen-
tations involved in them) in frames directly follows from the claim that frames
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Figure 5: Frame for a specific reaching movement
constitute a general format of representation. In this sense, the frame of a speciVc
reaching movement can be displayed like shown in Vgure 5.
According to this (simpliVed) analysis, the movement is speciVed by param-
eters which are in turn further speciVed and transformed into a speciVc motor
command (cf. diagrams of motor control in Synofzik et al., 2008). This motor
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command can now be executed (i. e. be sent to the muscles) or not. In the latter
case, the movement is merely “imagined” or “simulated” (although not necessar-
ily consciously). The important point here is that the upper part of Vgure 5 has to
be understood as a representation of the location of an object whereas the lower
part is a representation of a movement; these parts in combination represent a
location of an object as a movement (or in terms of a movement).
Usually, motor control mechanisms are depicted in Wow-charts (e. g. in Synofzik
et al., 2008). The general idea is that each movement (except for reWexes) starts
with a “motor intention”, which is a usually unconscious and non-conceptual part
of motor control (as opposed to the “primary” intention; see Vosgerau & Synofzik,
2010). For example, if you are going to chop up an onion, your primary intention
is to chop up the onion (completely). In contrast, for every cutting of a slice there
is a separate motor intention to move the knife in a speciVc way. This motor
intention is usually unconscious and is already in a motor format (something like
to move the knife forward while pressing it down). However, the motor intention
does not suXce for executing a movement, since several background conditions
have to be taken into account. For example, the movement will depend on the ac-
tual posture (e. g. where your hand with the knife is) and the surroundings (e. g.
where the onion is). Moreover, general facts about the kinematics of the own
body have to be taken into account (speciVed in the “body schema”; see e. g. Vos-
gerau, 2009). The part of the motor control process, in which the exact parameters
of the movement are speciVed, is often called “speciVcation of movement”. The
output of the speciVcation is then a motor command which can be sent to the ef-
fectors to elicit the movement. However, this last step is not obligatory—indeed,
our ability to imagine movements is usually explained by the capacity to run
through the motor control sequence without actually executing the movement.
Thus, the motor control mechanisms can be used “oU-line” to represent a move-
ment rather than to elicit a movement. This aspect of frame analysis provides two
main advantages over other formats of description (e. g. logical notations):
First, motor processes can be described as processes in which certain param-
eters play a role (e. g. motor intentions, posture). Therefore, the speciVc features
of motor control mechanisms can be displayed as shown in Vgure 6, as opposed
to logical notations in which there is no diUerence (explicitly) displayed between
motor-attributes and conceptual attributes (they are, in logical terms, all predi-
cates).
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Figure 6: Frame description of motor control
This allows for a reformulation of the question of how grounded abstract con-
cepts are in terms of frames: Are the values of the end-nodes of frames of con-
cepts values that we can also Vnd in sensorimotor processes? In other words:
Concept-frames can be combined with motor-control-frames if and only if there
is a certain overlap, i. e. if motor-values occur in the concept frame. This formula-
tion of the thesis of grounded cognition directly shows the explanatory advantage
of the thesis: It would explain why and how concepts can have a direct impact
on our behavior. For example, the motor intentions in the example above (onion
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chopping) could be values that also occur in the concept frame for ‘knife’, since
cutting is an aUordance of knifes.
Second, the conceptual categorization of an object does, of course, not auto-
matically lead to a behavior. The movement which is speciVed by the motor-
values needs not be executed. Thus, entertaining a concept like ‘knife’ can in-
volve the “activation” of a motor-representation without triggering the according
movement (this is what Barsalou Barsalou, 1999 calls “simulation”). In this sense,
frames can represent possibilities without introducing a modal operator: The pos-
sible movement is represented by motor values which build the basis for a motor
command although the motor command is not executed. This fact makes the
representation modal in the sense that it represents a merely possible movement
and not an actual movement. The speciVc advantage of frames over other for-
mats of representation is twofold: 1) we can represent modal attributes without
introducing modal operators, and 2) there is a straightforward sense in which
attribute values can be motor-parameters and not just arbitrary symbols which
do not stand in any meaningful relation to motor processing (as it is the case for
constants in predicate logic, for example).
5 Implications for the thesis of grounded cognition
According to the thesis of grounded cognition, the content of concepts is based
on sensorimotor processes, which are constitutive for the relevant concept. What
is to be analyzed to understand cognition in general is not mechanisms of com-
putation and abstract symbol manipulation, but rather the relation between con-
ceptualization and basal motor-processes. These motor processes therefore have
to be somehow encoded in the concept, they have to be a part or a property of
the concept. This view conforms with the fact that these encoded motor processes
are not (necessarily) reWected in the verbal structure of the concept. However that
holds as well for other functional and physical properties of a concept, which are
not reWected in the word form in most cases: The word for the concept ‘dog’ does
not reWect dog-properties nor does it refer to physical or functional properties of
dogs (Glenberg & Kaschak 2002).
Decomposition of concepts via frame analysis is a way to get to a cognitively
adequate account of the concept-structure, i. e. the properties assigned to objects
by this concept. The most important point, however, is that frame analysis of
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concepts allows us to speciVcally deVne what being grounded in action means:
If and only if the frame of a concept contains motor-values as base-level-values, it
is grounded on motor abilities. Concepts that do not contain such values cannot
be said to be grounded in action. Thus, frame analysis goes beyond the rather
vague and unspeciVc claim that concepts are based on modal representations as
opposed to abstract symbols (Barsalou 2008). It gives us a clear notion of being
grounded which can be applied not only to concepts tout court, but also to parts
of concepts. In this way, the “internal” structure of a concept can be taken into
account, which leads to a more speciVc notion of groundedness that can come in
well-deVned degrees: The transition between grounded and abstract concepts is
not a matter of on and oU; rather, it is possible that a mid-level concept contains
some grounded parts and at the same time already involves other non-grounded,
abstract parts.
Weber & Vosgerau (2012) discuss diUerent ways in which the (unspeciVc) thesis
of grounded action cognition can be interpreted. They argue that three versions
can be distinguished: The strong thesis basically collapses into the thesis that
thoughts (and a fortiori concepts) are a kind of motor ability. The moderate
thesis states that some concepts are constituted by motor processes but others
not. The weak thesis amounts to the claim that some motor abilities are necessary
to acquire certain concepts but can be lost after acquisition without damage to
the concept (i. e. motor abilities are among the acquisition conditions for some
concepts but they do not constitute them). In their paper they argue on theoretical
and empirical grounds, that the moderate thesis is the most plausible one.
The problem with the strong thesis is present already at a theoretical level,
since this thesis faces a serious threat of inVnite regress (for details see Vosgerau
& Newen, 2007). Moreover, the thesis is somewhat self-refuting: If it is true
that all concepts are a kind of motor ability, then it cannot be said anymore that
they are grounded in motor abilities.5 Thus, the strong thesis has to be refuted.
The weak thesis, on the other hand, can be rejected on the basis of results from
empirical studies (see Weber & Vosgerau, 2012 for details).
Having rejected both the strong and the weak version, there still is evidence
that at least some concepts are grounded in motor processes, and this exactly can
5 This is, of course, not a counter-argument against the thesis that thoughts are motor processes.
However, this thesis cannot be understood as a thesis of grounded cognition, and this is the im-
portant point here.
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be shown in frames. Obviously, not every part of a frame for a concept is based on
or related to motor-processes, but at least some parts of it should be interpreted
as values for motor-processes. So it is empirical evidence on the one hand that
advises for the rejection of both the strong versions of grounded cognition, but
on the other hand, conceptual frame-analysis oUers good reason to defend and
even further reVne the moderate version. As reasons for dismissal of a version of
a thesis are not suXcient reasons for accepting another version, the contribution
of frame-analysis can be seen in the light of giving independent motivations to
support the moderate version as described above.
6 Development of concepts
The analysis of concepts in terms of frames yields a cognitively adequate repre-
sentation of concepts. In particular, the sensorimotor grounding of concepts is
represented in frames by introducing sensorimotor values. However, concepts
apparently diUer in degree of groundedness: There are a lot of concepts that are
very unlikely to contain motor values (e. g. concepts like ‘state’, ‘freedom’, or
‘kinship’). Thus, the question of how abstract concepts can develop on the basis
of sensorimotor-grounded concepts has to be answered by theories of grounded
cognition.
Again, frame analysis turns out to be a useful tool for this task. As shown
above, frame analysis is apt to analyze simple representations as they occur in
ants. These representations are grounded in the full sense and are not yet abstract
enough to be called “concepts”. Starting with such simple frames, we have shown
that more and more abstract frames of concepts can be developed. First of all,
other nodes are added in order to represent a certain property (e. g. the location)
of an object as the property of the object. This concept is more abstract since it
now allows the representation of one and the same property in diUerent objects
and the representation of diUerent properties of the same object (Newen & Bartels
2007).
One possible next step is to abstract from the concrete values specifying a
movement to more abstract forms of motor-representations specifying general
schemata of movements. For example, the frame in Vgure 5 may be appropriate
to display my representation of the location of a discussion partner in terms of
the head movement I have to execute in order to look at him/her. At the same
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time, it is very plausible that I am able to represent the location of a discussion
partner in a more general format that comprises not only head movements but
also arm movements (how to reach him/her). Even more abstract are represen-
tations in terms of allocentric coordinates that occur both later in the ontogenesis
of humans and later in the evolutionary development of species (Vosgerau 2007).
In this way, frame analysis provides a powerful tool to detect abstraction mech-
anisms that lead from very basic representations that only presuppose sensorimo-
tor abilities to more abstract concepts that get more independent of sensorimotor
grounding. Thus, both phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of conceptual
abilities is analyzable within frames in terms of diUerent abstraction mechanisms.
Of course, it remains an open question how many diUerent abstraction mecha-
nisms there are at work and how far up such mechanisms can get us in terms of
abstractness.
7 Conclusion
To sum up, we have laid out the foundations of our frame-theory and argued for
its advantages over other formats of representing concepts. The frames speciVed
here are capable of representing concepts and information of any desired grade
of detail. The frames are not restricted to sortal concepts but can easily repre-
sent relational concepts as well. Although it is in principle possible to express
the content of the frames in logical formulas, the representation in frames has
clear advantages over e. g. predicates of Vrst order logics: no Vxed arities have
to be stipulated for the predicates, as well as no order of the arguments have to
be stipulated, due to the non-linear structure of frames. These advantages con-
cern the formal aspects of frame-representation, so it is worth pointing to one
of the psychological incitements for adopting the frame theory: There clearly is
evidence that cognitive processes can be understood in terms of attribute-value
sets and relations, so the explanatory role of frames within cognitive science is
quite clear.
With the frame-theory as a foundation of cognitive representation and pro-
cessing of concepts, the idea of grounding concepts in action can thus be formu-
lated in a cognitively adequate way and be embedded in a formalizable model
of concept-representation. We have shown what it can mean for a concept to be
grounded in sensorimotor processes, i. e. to rely on sensorimotor values in frames
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at a very basal level. This notion of groundedness suits well the idea of high-level
and low-level processing, where sensorimotor processes are thought to be low-
level processes which are at play at a very early stage in concept development
but do not cease to be a part of higher-level concept processing. Frames reWect
this hierarchical understanding of concept development in an appropriate way,
as higher-level concepts come along with higher degrees of abstraction within
concepts. These degrees and the responsible mechanisms of abstraction can be
made visible via frame analysis. The capability of frames to highlight abstraction
combined with the possibility to implement modality within representations of
motor-based concepts marks frames as a perfect tool for analyzing action-related
concepts.
Some further questions remain: As already mentioned above, it is far from clear
how concepts exhibiting a very high degree of abstractness could be sensibly un-
derstood as grounded on sensorimotor processes. If one adopts our account of
analyzing concepts via frames, at least a promising strategy for detecting mecha-
nisms of abstraction is at hand, worth to be persecuted. Another question con-
cerns the scope of the idea of grounded concepts: do literally all concepts have to
be grounded in the above sense, or would it already be suXcient for the thesis of
grounded cognition that some concepts are straightforwardly grounded, allow-
ing for the possibility of non-grounded concepts? To answer these questions, a
lot more empirical and conceptual research on abstract concept grounding has to
be done. Our method of analyzing can thus be understood as just a starting point,
but a very promising one.
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